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ABSTRACT
A number of online services nowadays rely upon machine learning
to extract valuable information from data collected in the wild.
This exposes learning algorithms to the threat of data poisoning,
i.e., a coordinate attack in which a fraction of the training data is
controlled by the attacker and manipulated to subvert the learning
process. To date, these attacks have been devised only against a
limited class of binary learning algorithms, due to the inherent
complexity of the gradient-based procedure used to optimize the
poisoning points (a.k.a. adversarial training examples). In this work,
we first extend the definition of poisoning attacks to multiclass
problems. We then propose a novel poisoning algorithm based on
the idea of back-gradient optimization, i.e., to compute the gradient
of interest through automatic differentiation, while also reversing
the learning procedure to drastically reduce the attack complexity.
Compared to current poisoning strategies, our approach is able to
target a wider class of learning algorithms, trained with gradient-
based procedures, including neural networks and deep learning
architectures. We empirically evaluate its effectiveness on several
application examples, including spam filtering, malware detection,
and handwritten digit recognition. We finally show that, similarly
to adversarial test examples, adversarial training examples can also
be transferred across different learning algorithms.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing Methodologies→Machine Learning;
KEYWORDS
Adversarial Machine Learning, Training Data Poisoning, Adversar-
ial Examples, Deep Learning.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years technology has become pervasive, enabling a rapid
a disruptive change in the way society is organized. Our data is
provided to third-party services which are supposed to facilitate
and protect our daily work and activities. Most of these services
leverage machine learning to extract valuable information from
the overwhelming amount of input data received. Although this
provides advantages to the users themselves, e.g., in terms of us-
ability and functionality of such services, it is also clear that these
services may be abused, providing great opportunities for cyber-
criminals to conduct novel, illicit, and highly-profitable activities.
Being one of the main components behind such services makes
machine learning an appealing target for attackers, who may gain
a significant advantage by gaming the learning algorithm. Notably,
machine learning itself can be the weakest link in the security chain,
as its vulnerabilities can be exploited by the attacker to compro-
mise the whole system infrastructure. To this end, she may inject
malicious data to poison the learning process, or manipulate data
at test time to evade detection.1 These kinds of attack have been
reported against anti-virus engines, anti-spam filters, and systems
aimed to detect fake profiles or news in social networks – all prob-
lems involving a well-crafted deployment of machine learning algo-
rithms [8, 16, 17, 19, 23, 25, 32, 34, 37–39]. Such attacks have fuelled
a growing interest in the research area of adversarial machine learn-
ing, at the intersection of cybersecurity and machine learning. This
recent research field aims at understanding the security properties
of current learning algorithms, as well as at developing more secure
ones [7, 16, 17].
Among the different attack scenarios envisaged against machine
learning, poisoning attacks are considered one of the most relevant
and emerging security threats for data-driven technologies, i.e.,
technologies relying upon the collection of large amounts of data
in the wild [17]. In a poisoning attack, the attacker is assumed to
control a fraction of the training data used by the learning algorithm,
with the goal of subverting the entire learning process, or facilitate
subsequent system evasion [8, 19, 23, 25, 32, 39]. More practically,
data poisoning is already a relevant threat in different application
domains. For instance, some online services directly exploit users’
feedback on their decisions to update the trained model. PDFRate2
is an online malware detection tool that analyzes the submitted
PDF files to reveal the presence of embedded malware [34]. After
classification, it allows the user to provide feedback on its decision,
i.e., to confirm or not the classification result. A malicious user
may thus provide wrong feedback to gradually poison the system
and compromise its performance over time. Notably, there is a
more general underlying problem related to the collection of large
data volumes with reliable labels. This is a well-known problem
1We refer to the attacker here as feminine due to the common interpretation as “Eve”
or “Carol” in cryptography and security.
2http://pdfrate.com
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in malware detection, where malware samples are collected by
means of compromised machines with known vulnerabilities (i.e.,
honeypots), or via other online services, like VirusTotal,3 in which
labelling errors are often reported.
Previous work has developed poisoning attacks against popular
learning algorithms like Support Vector Machines (SVMs), LASSO,
logistic and ridge regression, in different applications, like spam
and malware detection [8, 19, 20, 23, 25, 32, 39]. The main technical
difficulty in devising a poisoning attack is the computation of the
poisoning samples, also recently referred to as adversarial training
examples [20]. This requires solving a bilevel optimization problem
in which the outer optimization amounts to maximizing the classifi-
cation error on an untainted validation set, while the inner optimiza-
tion corresponds to training the learning algorithm on the poisoned
data [23]. Since solving this problem with black-box optimization
is too computationally demanding, previous work has exploited
gradient-based optimization, along with the idea of implicit differ-
entiation. The latter consists of replacing the inner optimization
problem with its stationarity (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker, KKT) condi-
tions to derive an implicit equation for the gradient [8, 20, 23, 39].
This approach however can only be used against a limited class of
learning algorithms, excluding neural networks and deep learning
architectures, due to the inherent complexity of the procedure used
to compute the required gradient. Another limitation is that, to
date, previous work has only considered poisoning of two-class
learning algorithms.
In this work, we overcome these limitations by first extending
the threat model proposed in [1, 2, 7, 16] to account for multiclass
poisoning attacks (Sect. 2). We then exploit a recent technique
called back-gradient optimization, originally proposed for hyper-
parameter optimization [3, 14, 22, 31], to implement a much more
computationally-efficient poisoning attack. The underlying idea is
to compute the gradient of interest through reverse-mode (auto-
matic) differentiation (i.e., back-propagation), while reversing the
underlying learning procedure to trace back the entire sequence
of parameter updates performed during learning, without storing
it. In fact, storing this sequence in memory would be infeasible for
learning algorithms that optimize a large set of parameters across
several iterations. Our poisoning algorithm only requires the learn-
ing algorithm to update its parameters during training in a smooth
manner (e.g., through gradient descent), to correctly trace these
changes backwards. Accordingly, compared to previously proposed
poisoning strategies, our approach is the first capable of targeting
a wider class of learning algorithms, trainable with gradient-based
procedures, like neural networks and deep learning architectures
(Sect. 3).
Another important contribution of this work is to show how
the performance of learning algorithms may be drastically compro-
mised even by the presence of a small fraction of poisoning points
in the training data, in the context of real-world applications like
spam filtering, malware detection, and handwritten digit recogni-
tion (Sect. 4). We also investigate the transferability property of
poisoning attacks, i.e., the extent to which attacks devised against
a specific learning algorithm are effective against different ones.
To our knowledge, this property has been investigated for evasion
3https://virustotal.com
attacks (a.k.a. adversarial test examples), i.e., attacks aimed to evade
a trained classifier at test time [6, 24, 27, 37], but never for poisoning
attacks. We conclude our work by discussing related work (Sect. 5),
the main limitations of our approach, and future research directions
(Sect. 6).
2 THREAT MODEL
In this section, we summarize the framework originally proposed
in [1, 2, 16] and subsequently extended in [7], which enables one
to envision different attack scenarios against learning algorithms
(including deep learning ones), and to craft the corresponding attack
samples. Remarkably, these include attacks at training and at test
time, usually referred to as poisoning and evasion attacks [6–8, 16,
23, 39] or, more recently, as adversarial (training and test) examples
(when crafted against deep learning algorithms) [27, 28, 36].
The framework characterizes the attacker according to her goal,
knowledge of the targeted system, and capability of manipulating
the input data. Based on these assumptions, it allows one to define
an optimal attack strategy as an optimization problem whose solu-
tion amounts to the construction of the attack samples, i.e., of the
adversarial examples.
In this work, we extend this framework, originally developed for
binary classification problems, to multiclass classification. While
this generalization holds for evasion attacks too, we only detail
here the main poisoning attack scenarios.
Notation. In a classification task, given the instance space X and
the label space Y, the learner aims to estimate the underlying (pos-
sibly noisy) latent function f that maps X 7→ Y. Given a training
set Dtr = {x i ,yi }ni=1 with n i.i.d. samples drawn from the under-
lying probability distribution p(X,Y),4 we can estimate f with a
parametric or non-parametric modelM trained by minimizing an
objective function L(D,w) (normally, a tractable estimate of the
generalization error), w.r.t. its parameters and/or hyperparameters
w .5
Thus, while L denotes the learner’s objective function (possibly
including regularization), we use L(D,w) to denote only the loss
incurred when evaluating the learner parameterized byw on the
samples in D.
2.1 Attacker’s Goal
The goal of the attack is determined in terms of the desired secu-
rity violation and attack specificity. In multiclass classification,
misclassifying a sample does not have a unique meaning, as there
is more than one class different from the correct one. Accordingly,
we extend the current framework by introducing the concept of
error specificity. These three characteristics are detailed below.
Security Violation. This characteristic defines the high-level se-
curity violation caused by the attack, as normally done in security
engineering. It can be: an integrity violation, if malicious activities
evade detection without compromising normal system operation;
4While normally the set notation {x i , yi }ni=1 does not admit duplicate entries, we
admit our data sets to contain potentially duplicated points.
5For instance, for kernelized SVMs,w may include the dual variablesα , the bias b , and
even the regularization parameterC . In this work, as in [8, 23, 39], we however consider
only the optimization of the model parameters, and not of its hyperparameters.
an availability violation, if normal system functionality is com-
promised, e.g., by increasing the classification error; or a privacy
violation, if the attacker obtains private information about the sys-
tem, its users or data by reverse-engineering the learning algorithm.
Attack Specificity. This characteristic ranges from targeted to
indiscriminate, respectively, if the attack aims to cause misclassifi-
cation of a specific set of samples (to target a given system user or
protected service), or of any sample (to target any system user or
protected service).
Error Specificity.We introduce here this characteristic to disam-
biguate the notion of misclassification in multiclass problems. The
error specificity can thus be: specific, if the attacker aims to have a
sample misclassified as a specific class; or generic, if the attacker
aims to have a sample misclassified as any of the classes different
from the true class.6
2.2 Attacker’s Knowledge
The attacker can have different levels of knowledge of the targeted
system, including: (k .i) the training data Dtr; (k .ii) the feature set
X; (k .iii) the learning algorithmM, along with the objective func-
tion L minimized during training; and, possibly, (k .iv) its (trained)
parametersw . The attacker’s knowledge can thus be characterized
in terms of a space Θ that encodes the aforementioned assumptions
(k .i)-(k .iv) as θ = (D,X,M,w). Depending on the assumptions
made on each of these components, one can envisage different at-
tack scenarios. Typically, two main settings are considered, referred
to as attacks with perfect and limited knowledge.
Perfect-Knowledge (PK) Attacks. In this case, the attacker is
assumed to know everything about the targeted system. Although
this setting may be not always representative of practical cases, it
enables us to perform a worst-case evaluation of the security of
learning algorithms under attack, highlighting the upper bounds on
the performance degradation that may be incurred by the system
under attack. In this case, we have θPK = (D,X,M,w).
Limited-Knowledge (LK) Attacks. Although LK attacks admit a
wide range of possibilities, the attacker is typically assumed to know
the feature representationX and the learning algorithmM, but not
the training data (for which surrogate data from similar sources can
be collected). We refer to this case here as LK attacks with Surrogate
Data (LK-SD), and denote it with θLK−SD = (Dˆ,X,M, wˆ) (using
the hat symbol to denote limited knowledge of a given component).
Notably, in this case, as the attacker is only given a surrogate data
set Dˆ, also the learner’s parameters have to be estimated by the
attacker, e.g., by optimizing L on Dˆ.
Similarly, we refer to the case in which the attacker knows the
training data (e.g., if the learning algorithm is trained on publicly-
available data), but not the learning algorithm (for which a sur-
rogate learner can be trained on the available data) as LK attacks
with Surrogate Learners (LK-SL). This scenario can be denoted
with θLK−SL = (D,X, Mˆ, wˆ), even though the parameter vector
wˆ may belong to a different vector space than that of the targeted
learner. Note that LK-SL attacks also include the case in which the
6In [28], the authors defined targeted and indiscriminate attacks (at test time) depending
on whether the attacker aims to cause specific or generic errors. Here we do not follow
their naming convention, as it can cause confusion with the interpretation of targeted
and indiscriminate attacks introduced in previous work [1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 16, 39].
attacker knows the learning algorithm, but she is not able to derive
an optimal attack strategy against it (e.g., if the corresponding op-
timization problem is not tractable or difficult to solve), and thus
uses a surrogate learning model to this end. Experiments on the
transferability of attacks among learning algorithms, firstly demon-
strated in [6] and then in subsequent work on deep learners [27],
fall under this category of attacks.
2.3 Attacker’s Capability
This characteristic is defined based on the influence that the at-
tacker has on the input data, and on the presence of data manip-
ulation constraints.
Attack Influence. In supervised learning, the attack influence can
be causative, if the attacker can influence both training and test
data, or exploratory, if the attacker can only manipulate test data.
These settings are more commonly referred to as poisoning and
evasion attacks [2, 6–8, 16, 23, 39].
Data Manipulation Constraints. Another aspect related to the
attacker’s capability is the presence of constraints on the manipu-
lation of input data, which is however strongly dependent on the
given practical scenario. For example, if the attacker aims to evade a
malware classification system, she should manipulate the exploita-
tion code embedded in the malware sample without compromising
its intrusive functionality. In the case of poisoning, the labels as-
signed to the training samples are not typically under the control
of the attacker. She should thus consider additional constraints
while manipulating the poisoning samples to have them labelled as
desired. Typically, these constraints can be nevertheless accounted
for in the definition of the optimal attack strategy. In particular, we
characterize them by assuming that an initial set of attack samples
Dc is given, and that it is modified according to a space of possible
modifications Φ(Dc ).
2.4 Attack Strategy
Given the attacker’s knowledge θ ∈ Θ and a set of manipulated at-
tack samples D ′c ∈ Φ(Dc ), the attacker’s goal can be characterized
in terms of an objective function A(D ′c ,θ ) ∈ R which evaluates
how effective the attacks D ′c are. The optimal attack strategy can
be thus given as:
D⋆c ∈ arg max
D′c ∈Φ(Dc )
A(D ′c ,θ ) (1)
While this high-level formulation encompasses both evasion and
poisoning attacks, in both binary and multiclass problems, in the
remainder of this work we only focus on the definition of some
poisoning attack scenarios.
2.5 Poisoning Attack Scenarios
We focus here on two poisoning attack scenarios of interest for mul-
ticlass problems, noting that other attack scenarios can be derived
in a similar manner.
Error-Generic Poisoning Attacks. The most common scenario
considered in previous work [8, 23, 39] considers poisoning two-
class learning algorithms to cause a denial of service. This is an
availability attack, and it could be targeted or indiscriminate, de-
pending on whether it affects a specific system user or service, or
any of them. In the multiclass case, it is thus natural to extend this
scenario assuming that the attacker is not aiming to cause specific
errors, but only generic misclassifications. As in [8, 23, 39], this
poisoning attack (as any other poisoning attack) requires solving
a bilevel optimization, where the inner problem is the learning
problem. This can be made explicit by rewriting Eq. (1) as:
D⋆c ∈ arg max
D′c ∈Φ(Dc )
A(D ′c ,θ ) = L(Dˆval, wˆ) , (2)
s.t. wˆ ∈ arg min
w ′∈W
L(Dˆtr ∪ D ′c ,w ′) , (3)
where the surrogate data Dˆ available to the attacker is divided into
two disjoint sets Dˆtr and Dˆval. The former, alongwith the poisoning
points D ′c is used to learn the surrogate model, while the latter is
used to evaluate the impact of the poisoning samples on untainted
data, through the function A(D ′c ,θ ). In this case, the function
A(D ′c ,θ ) is simply defined in terms of a loss function L(Dˆval, wˆ)
that evaluates the performance of the (poisoned) surrogate model
on Dˆval. The dependency of A on D ′c is thus indirectly encoded
through the parameters wˆ of the (poisoned) surrogate model.7 Note
that, since the learning algorithm (even if convex) may not exhibit
a unique solution in the feasible set W, the outer problem has
to be evaluated using the exact solution wˆ found by the inner
optimization. Worth remarking, this formulation encompasses all
previously-proposed poisoning attacks against binary learners [8,
23, 39], provided that the loss function L is selected accordingly
(e.g., using the hinge loss against SVMs [8]). In the multiclass case,
one can use a multiclass loss function, like the log-loss with softmax
activation, as done in our experiments.
Error-Specific Poisoning Attacks. Here, we assume that the at-
tacker’s goal is to cause specific misclassifications – a plausible
scenario only for multiclass problems. This attack can cause an
integrity or an availability violation, and it can also be targeted or
indiscriminate, depending on the desired misclassifications. The
poisoning problem remains that given by Eqs. (2)-(3), though the
objective is defined as:
A(D ′c ,θ ) = −L(Dˆ ′val, wˆ) , (4)
where Dˆ ′val is a set that contains the same data as Dˆval, though with
different labels, chosen by the attacker. These labels correspond to
the desired misclassifications, and this is why there is a minus sign
in front of L, i.e., the attacker effectively aims atminimizing the loss
on her desired set of labels. Note that, to implement an integrity
violation or a targeted attack, some of these labels may actually be
the same as the true labels (such that normal system operation is
not compromised, or only specific system users are affected).
3 POISONING ATTACKS WITH
BACK-GRADIENT OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we first discuss how the bilevel optimization given
by Eqs. (2)-(3) has been solved in previous work to develop gradient-
based poisoning attacks [8, 20, 23, 39]. As we will see, these attacks
can only be used against a limited class of learning algorithms, ex-
cluding neural networks and deep learning architectures, due to the
7Note that A can also be directly dependent on D′c , as in the case of nonparametric
models; e.g., in kernelized SVMs, when the poisoning points are support vectors [8].
inherent complexity of the procedure used to compute the required
gradient. To overcome this limitation, we exploit a recent technique
called back-gradient optimization [14, 22], which allows comput-
ing the gradient of interest in a more computationally-efficient
and stabler manner. Notably, this enables us to devise the first poi-
soning attack able to target neural networks and deep learning
architectures (without using any surrogate model).
Before delving into the technical details, we make the same
assumptions made in previous work [8, 23, 39] to reduce the com-
plexity of Problem (2)-(3): (i) we consider the optimization of one
poisoning point at a time, denoted hereafter with xc ; and (ii) we
assume that its label yc is initially chosen by the attacker, and kept
fixed during the optimization. The poisoning problem can be thus
simplified as:
x⋆c ∈ arg max
x ′c ∈Φ({x c ,yc })
A({x ′c ,yc },θ ) = L(Dˆval, wˆ) , (5)
s.t. wˆ ∈ arg min
w ′∈W
L(x ′c ,w ′) . (6)
The function Φ imposes constraints on the manipulation of xc , e.g.,
upper and lower bounds on its manipulated values. These may also
depend on yc , e.g., to ensure that the poisoning sample is labelled
as desired when updating the targeted classifier. Note also that, for
notational simplicity, we only report x ′c as the first argument of L
instead of Dˆtr ∪ {x ′c ,yc }.
Gradient-based Poisoning Attacks.We discuss here how Prob-
lem (5)-(6) has been solved in previous work [8, 20, 23, 39]. For
some classes of loss functions L and learning objective functions
L, this problem can be indeed solved through gradient ascent. In
particular, provided that the loss function L is differentiable w.r.t.w
and xc , we can compute the gradient ∇x cA using the chain rule:
∇x cA = ∇x c L +
∂wˆ
∂xc
⊤
∇wL , (7)
where L(Dˆval, wˆ) is evaluated on the parameters wˆ learned after
training (including the poisoning point). The main difficulty here is
computing ∂wˆ∂x c , i.e., understanding how the solution of the learning
algorithm varies w.r.t. the poisoning point. Under some regularity
conditions, this can be done by replacing the inner learning problem
with its stationarity (KKT) conditions. For example, this holds if
the learning problem L is convex, which implies that all stationary
points are global minima [31]. In fact, poisoning attacks have been
developed so far only against learning algorithms with convex
objectives [8, 20, 23, 39]. The trick here is to replace the inner
optimizationwith the implicit function∇wL(Dtr∪{xc ,yc }, wˆ) = 0,
corresponding to its KKT conditions. Then, assuming that it is
differentiable w.r.t. xc , one yields the linear system ∇x c∇wL +
∂wˆ
∂x c
⊤∇2wL = 0. If ∇2wL is not singular, we can solve this system
w.r.t. ∂wˆ∂x c , and substitute its expression in Eq. (7), yielding:
∇x cA = ∇x c L − (∇x c∇wL)(∇2wL)−1∇wL . (8)
This gradient is then iteratively used to update the poisoning point
through gradient ascent, as shown in Algorithm 1.8 Recall that the
8Note that Algorithm 1 can be exploited to optimize multiple poisoning points too. As
in [39], the idea is to perform several passes over the set of poisoning samples, using
Algorithm 1 to optimize each poisoning point at a time, while keeping the other points
fixed. Line searches can also be exploited to reduce complexity.
Algorithm 1 Poisoning Attack Algorithm
Input: Dˆtr, Dˆval, L, L, the initial poisoning point x (0)c , its label yc ,
the learning rate η, a small positive constant ε .
1: i ← 0 (iteration counter)
2: repeat
3: wˆ ∈ arg minw ′ L(x (i)c ,w ′) (train learning algorithm)
4: x (i+1)c ← ΠΦ
(
xc (i) + η∇x cA({x (i)c ,yc })
)
5: i ← i + 1
6: until A({x (i)c ,yc }) − A({x (i−1)c ,yc }) < ε
Output: the final poisoning point xc ← x (i)c
projection operator ΠΦ is used to map the current poisoning point
onto the feasible set Φ (cf. Eqs. 5-6).
This is the state-of-the-art approach used to implement current
poisoning attacks [8, 20, 23, 39]. The problem here is that computing
and inverting ∇2wL scales in time as O(p3) and in memory as O(p2),
being p the cardinality ofw . Moreover, Eq. (8) requires solving one
linear system per parameter. These aspects make it prohibitive to
assess the effectiveness of poisoning attacks in a variety of practical
settings.
To mitigate these issues, as suggested in [13, 14, 20, 22], one can
apply conjugate gradient descent to solve a simpler linear system,
obtained by a trivial re-organization of the terms in the second
part of Eq. (8). In particular, one can set (∇2wL) v = ∇wL, and
compute ∇xcA = ∇x c L − ∇xc∇wL v. The computation of the
matrices ∇x c∇wL and ∇2wL can also be avoided using Hessian-
vector products [30]:
(∇x c∇wL) z = limh→0
1
h
(∇x cL (x ′c , wˆ + hz) − ∇x cL (x ′c , wˆ ) ) ,
(∇w∇wL) z = lim
h→0
1
h
(∇wL (x ′c , wˆ + hz) − ∇wL (x ′c , wˆ ) ) .
Although this approach allows poisoning learning algorithms more
efficiently w.r.t. previous work [8, 23, 39], it still requires the inner
learning problem to be solved exactly. From a practical perspective,
this means that the KKT conditions have to be met with satisfying
numerical accuracy. However, as these problems are always solved
to a finite accuracy, it may happen that the gradient ∇x cA is not
sufficiently precise, especially if convergence thresholds are too
loose [14, 22].
It is thus clear that such an approach can not be used, in practice,
to poison learning algorithms like neural networks and deep learn-
ing architectures, as it may not only be difficult to derive proper
stationarity conditions involving all parameters, but also as it may
be too computationally demanding to train such learning algo-
rithms with sufficient precision to correctly compute the gradient
∇x cA.
Poisoning with Back-gradient Optimization. In this work, we
overcome this limitation by exploiting back-gradient optimization [14,
22]. This technique has been first exploited in the context of energy-
based models and hyperparameter optimization, to solve bilevel
optimization problems similar to the poisoning problem discussed
before. The underlying idea of this approach is to replace the inner
optimization with a set of iterations performed by the learning
Algorithm 2 Gradient Descent
Input: initial parametersw0, learning rate η, Dˆtr, L.
1: for t = 0, . . . ,T − 1 do
2: gt = ∇wL(Dˆtr,wt )
3: wt+1 ← wt − η gt
4: end for
Output: trained parameterswT
Algorithm 3 Back-gradient Descent
Input: trained parameterswT , learning rate η, Dˆtr, Dˆval,
poisoning point x ′c , yc , loss function L, learner’s objective L.
initialize dxc ← 0, dw ← ∇wL(Dˆval,wT )
1: for t = T , . . . , 1 do
2: dxc ← dx ′c − η dw∇x c∇wL(x ′c ,wt )
3: dw ← dw − η dw∇w∇wL(x ′c ,wt )
4: gt−1 = ∇w tL(x ′c ,wt )
5: wt−1 = wt + αgt−1
6: end for
Output: ∇x cA = ∇x c L + dxc
algorithm to update the parametersw , provided that such updates
are smooth, as in the case of gradient-based learning algorithms.
According to [14], this technique allows to compute the desired gra-
dients in the outer problem using the parameterswT obtained from
an incomplete optimization of the inner problem (afterT iterations).
This represent a significant computational improvement compared
to traditional gradient-based approaches, since it only requires a
reduced number of training iterations for the learning algorithm.
This is especially important in large neural networks and deep
learning algorithms, where the computational cost per iteration
can be high. Then, assuming that the inner optimization runs for
T iterations, the idea is to exploit reverse-mode differentiation, or
back-propagation, to compute the gradient of the outer objective.
However, using back-propagation in a naïve manner would not
work for this class of problems, as it requires storing the whole
set of parameter updates w1, . . . ,wT performed during training,
along with the forward derivatives. These are indeed the elements
required to compute the gradient of the outer objective with a
backward pass (we refer the reader to [22] for more details). This
process can be extremely memory-demanding if the learning algo-
rithm runs for a large number of iterations T , and especially if the
number of parametersw is large (as in deep networks). Therefore,
to avoid storing the whole training trajectoryw1, . . . ,wT and the
required forward derivatives, Domke [14] and Maclaurin et al. [22]
proposed to compute them directly during the backward pass, by
reversing the steps followed by the learning algorithm to update
them. Computing wT , . . . ,w1 in reverse order w.r.t. the forward
step is clearly feasible only if the learning procedure can be ex-
actly traced backwards. Nevertheless, this happens to be feasible
for a large variety of gradient-based procedures, including gradient
descent with fixed step size, and stochastic gradient descent with
momentum.
Figure 1: Error-generic (top row) and error-specific (bottom row) poisoning attacks on a three-class synthetic dataset, against
a multiclass logistic classifier. In the error-specific case, the attacker aims to have red points misclassified as blue, while pre-
serving the labels of the other points. We report the decision regions on the clean (first column) and on the poisoned (second
column) data, in which we only add a poisoning point labelled as blue (highlighted with a blue circle). The validation loss
L(Dˆval, wˆ) and L(Dˆ ′val, wˆ), respectively maximized in error-generic and minimized in error-specific attacks, is shown in colors,
as a function of the attack point xc (third column), along with the corresponding back-gradients (shown as arrows), and the
path followed while optimizing xc . To show that the logistic loss used to estimate L provides a good approximation of the true
error, we also report the validation error measured with the zero-one loss on the same data (fourth column).
In this work, we leverage back-gradient descent to compute
∇x cA (Algorithm 3) by reversing a standard gradient-descent pro-
cedure with fixed step size that runs for a truncated training of the
learning algorithm to T iterations (Algorithm 2). Notably, lines 2-3
in Algorithm 3 can be efficiently computed with Hessian-vector
products, as discussed before. We exploit this algorithm to compute
the gradient ∇x cA in line 4 of our poisoning attack algorithm
(Algorithm 1). In this case, line 3 of Algorithm 1 is replaced with
the incomplete optimization of the learning algorithm, truncated
to T iterations. Note finally that, as in [14, 22], the time complexity
of our back-gradient descent is O(T ). This drastically reduces the
complexity of the computation of the outer gradient, making it fea-
sible to evaluate the effectiveness of poisoning attacks also against
large neural networks and deep learning algorithms. Moreover, this
outer gradient can be accurately estimated from a truncated opti-
mization of the inner problem with a reduced number of iterations.
This allows for a tractable computation of the poisoning points in
Algorithm 1, since training the learning algorithm at each iteration
can be prohibitive, especially for deep networks.
We conclude this section by noting that, in the case of error-
specific poisoning attacks (Sect. 2.5), the outer objective in Prob-
lem (5)-(6) is −L(Dˆ ′val , wˆ). This can be regarded as a minimization
problem, and it thus suffices to modify line 4 in Algorithm 1 to
update the poisoning point along the opposite direction. We clarify
this in Fig. 1, where we also discuss the different effect of error-
generic and error-specific poisoning attacks in a multiclass setting.
4 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness of the back-
gradient poisoning attacks described in Sect. 3 on spam andmalware
detection tasks. In these cases, we also assess whether poisoning
samples can be transferred across different learning algorithms.
We then investigate the impact of error-generic and error-specific
poisoning attacks in the well-known multiclass problem of hand-
written digit recognition. In this case, we also report the first proof-
of-concept adversarial training examples computed by poisoning a
convolutional neural network in an end-to-end manner (i.e., not just
using a surrogate model trained on the deep features, as in [20]).
4.1 Spam and Malware Detection
We consider here two distinct datasets, respectively representing
a spam email classification problem (Spambase) and a malware
detection task (Ransomware). The Spambase data [11] consists of a
collection of 4, 601 emails, including 1, 813 spam emails. Each email
is encoded as a feature vector consisting of 54 binary features, each
denoting the presence or absence of a given word in the email. The
Ransomware data [33] consists of 530 ransomware samples and 549
benign applications. Ransomware is a very recent kind of malware
which encrypts the data on the infected machine, and requires the
victim to pay a ransom to obtain the decryption key. This dataset
has 400 binary features accounting for different sets of actions, API
invocations, and modifications in the file system and registry keys
during the execution of the software.
We consider the following leaning algorithms: (i)Multi-Layer
Perceptrons (MLPs) with one hidden layer consisting of 10 neurons;
(ii) Logistic Regression (LR); and (iii) Adaline (ADA). For MLPs, we
have used hyperbolic tangent activation functions for the neurons
in the hidden layer, and softmax activations in the output layer.
Moreover, for MLPs and LR, we use the cross-entropy (or log-loss)
as the loss function, while we use the mean squared error for ADA.
We assume here that the attacker aims to cause a denial of ser-
vice, and thus runs a poisoning availability attack whose goal is
simply to maximize the classification error. Accordingly, we run
Algorithm 1 injecting up to 20 poisoning points in the training data.
We initialize the poisoning points by cloning training points and
flipping their label. We set the number of iterationsT for obtaining
stable back-gradients to 200, 100, and 80, respectively for MLPs, LR
and ADA. We further consider two distinct settings: PK attacks,
in which the attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of the
attacked system (for a worst-case performance assessment); and
LK-SL attacks, in which she knows everything except for the learn-
ing algorithm, and thus uses a surrogate learner Mˆ. This scenario,
as discussed in Sect. 2.2, is useful to assess the transferability prop-
erty of the attack samples. To the best of our knowledge, this has
been demonstrated in [6, 27] for evasion attacks (i.e., adversarial test
examples) but never for poisoning attacks (i.e., adversarial training
examples). To this end, we optimize the poisoning samples using
alternatively MLPs, LR or ADA as the surrogate learner, and then
evaluate the impact of the corresponding attacks against the other
two algorithms.
The experimental results, shown in Figs. 2-3, are averaged on 10
independent random data splits. In each split, we use 100 samples
for training and 400 for validation, i.e., to respectively construct
Dtr and Dval. Recall indeed that in both PK and LK-SL settings,
the attacker has perfect knowledge of the training set used to learn
the true (attacked) model, i.e., Dˆtr = Dtr. The remaining samples
are used for testing, i.e., to assess the classification error under
poisoning.9
We can observe from Fig. 2 that PK poisoning attacks can signifi-
cantly compromise the performance of all the considered classifiers.
In particular, on Spambase, they cause the classification error of
ADA and LR to increase up to 30% even if the attacker only controls
15% of the training data. Although the MLP is more resilient to
poisoning than these linear classifiers, its classification error also
increases significantly, up to 25%, which is not tolerable in several
practical settings. The results for PK attacks on Ransomware are
similar, although the MLP seems as vulnerable as ADA and LR in
this case.
Transferability of Poisoning Samples. Regarding LK-SL poison-
ing attacks, we can observe from Fig. 3 that the attack points gen-
erated using a linear classifier (either ADA or LR) as the surrogate
model have a very similar impact on the other linear classifier. In
contrast, the poisoning points crafted with these linear algorithms
have a lower impact against the MLP, although its performance is
still noticeably affected. When the MLP is used as the surrogate
model, instead, the performance degradation of the other algo-
rithms is similar. However, the impact of these attacks is much
9Note indeed that the validation error only provides a biased estimate of the true
classification error, as it is used by the attacker to optimize the poisoning points [8].
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Figure 2: Results for PK poisoning attacks.
lower. To summarize, our results show that the attack points can
be effectively transferred across linear algorithms and also have
a noticeable impact on (nonlinear) neural networks. In contrast,
transferring poisoning samples from nonlinear to linear models
seems to be less effective.
4.2 Handwritten Digit Recognition
We consider here the problem of handwritten digit recognition,
which involves 10 classes (each corresponding to a digit, from 0 to 9),
using theMNIST data [21]. Each digit image consists of 28×28 = 784
pixels, ranging from 0 to 255 (images are in grayscale). We divide
each pixel value by 255 and use it as a feature. We evaluate the effect
of error-generic and error-specific poisoning strategies against a
multiclass LR classifier using softmax activation and the log-loss as
the loss function.
Error-generic attack. In this case, the attacker aims to maximize
the classification error regardless of the resulting kinds of error,
as described in Sect. 2.5. This is thus an availability attack, aimed
to cause a denial of service. We generate 10 independent random
splits using 1000 samples for training, 1000 for validation, and
8000 for testing. To compute the back-gradients ∇x cA required
by our poisoning attack, we use T = 60 iterations. We initialize
the poisoning points by cloning randomly-chosen training points
and changing their label at random In addition, we compare our
poisoning attack strategy here against a label-flip attack in which
the attack points are drawn from the validation set and their labels
are flipped at random. In both cases, we inject up to 60 attack points
into the training set.
The results are shown in Fig. 4 (top row). Note first that our
error-generic poisoning attack almost doubles the classification
error in the absence of poisoning, with less than 6% of poisoning
points. It is also much more effective than random label flips and,
as expected, it causes a similar increase of the classification error
over all classes (although some classes are easier to poison, like
digit 5). This is even more evident from the difference between the
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Figure 3: Results for LK-SL poisoning attacks (transferability of poisoning samples) on Spambase (top row) and Ransomware
(bottom row).
confusion matrix obtained under 6% poisoning and that obtained
in the absence of attack.
Error-specific attack. Here, we assume that the attacker aims to
misclassify 8s as 3s, while not having any preference regarding
the classification of the other digits. This can be thus regarded
as an availability attack, targeted to cause the misclassification
of a specific set of samples. We generate 10 independent random
splits with 1000 training samples, 4000 samples for validation, and
5000 samples for testing. Recall that the goal of the attacker in this
scenario is described by Eq. (4). In particular, she aims at minimizing
L(Dˆ ′val , wˆ), where the samples in the validation set Dˆ ′val are re-
labelled according to the attacker’s goal. Here, the validation set
thus only consists of digits of class 8 labelled as 3. We set T = 60
to compute the back-gradients used in our poisoning attack, and
inject up to 40 poisoning points into the training set. We initialize
the poisoning points by cloning randomly-chosen samples from
the classes 3 and 8 in the training set, and flipping their label from
3 to 8, or vice-versa. We consider only these two classes here as
they are the only two actively involved in the attack.
The results are shown in Fig. 4 (bottom row).We can observe that
only the classification error rate for digit 8 is significantly affected,
as expected. In particular, it is clear from the difference of the
confusion matrix obtained under poisoning and the one obtained
in the absence of attack that most of the 8s are misclassified as 3s.
After adding less than 4% of poisoning points, in fact, the error rate
for digit 8 increases approximately from 20% to 50%. Note that, as a
side effect, the error rate of digit 3 also slightly increases, though
not to a significant extent.
Poisoning Deep Neural Networks. We finally report a proof-
of-concept experiment to show the applicability of our attack al-
gorithm to poison a deep network in an end-to-end manner, i.e.,
accounting for all weight updates in each layer (instead of using
a surrogate model trained on a frozen deep feature representa-
tion [20]). To this end, we consider the convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) proposed in [21] for classification of the MNIST digit
data, which requires optimizing more than 450, 000 parameters.10
In this proof-of-concept attack, we inject 10 poisoning points into
the training data, and repeat the experiment on 5 independent data
splits, considering 1, 000 samples for training, and 2, 000 for vali-
dation and testing. For simplicity, we only consider the classes of
digits 1, 5, and 6 in this case. We use Algorithm 1 to craft each single
poisoning point, but, similarly to [39], we optimize them iteratively,
making 2 passes over the whole set of poisoning samples. We also
use the line search exploited in [39], instead of a fixed gradient step
size, to reduce the attack complexity (i.e., the number of training
updates to the deep network). Under this setting, however, we find
that our attack points only slightly increase the classification error,
though not significantly, while random label flips do not have any
substantial effect. For comparison, we also attack a multiclass LR
classifier under the same setting, yielding an increase of the error
rate from 2% to 4.3% with poisoning attacks, and to only 2.1% with
random label flips. This shows that, at least in this simple case, deep
networks seem to be more resilient against (a very small fraction of)
poisoning attacks (i.e., less than 1%). Some of the poisoning samples
crafted against the CNN and the LR are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. We
report the initial digit (and its true label y), its poisoned version
(and its label yc ), and the difference between the two images, in
absolute value (rescaled to visually appreciate the modified pixels).
Notably, similarly to adversarial test examples, also poisoning sam-
ples against deep networks are visually indistinguishable from the
initial image (as in [20]), while this is not the case when targeting
the LR classifier. This might be due to the specific shape of the
decision function learned by the deep network in the input space,
as explained in the case of adversarial test examples [15, 36]. We
10We use the implementation available at https://github.com/tflearn/tflearn/blob/
master/examples/images/convnet_mnist.py.
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Figure 4: Error-generic (top row) and error-specific (bottom row) poisoning againstmulticlass LRon theMNISTdata. In the first
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however leave a more detailed investigation of this aspect to future
work, along with a more systematic security evaluation of deep
networks against poisoning attacks. We conclude this section with
a simple transferability experiment, in which we use the poisoning
samples crafted against the LR classifier to attack the CNN, and
vice-versa. In the former case, the attack is totally ineffective, while
in the latter case it has a similar effect to that of random label
flips (as the minimal modifications to the CNN-poisoning digits are
clearly irrelevant for the LR classifier).
5 RELATEDWORK
Seminal work on the analysis of supervised learning in the pres-
ence of omniscient attackers that can compromise the training data
has been presented in [12, 18]. While their results show the in-
feasibility of learning in such settings, their analysis reports an
overly-pessimistic perspective on the problem. The first practical
poisoning attacks against two-class classification algorithms have
been proposed in [19, 26], in the context of spam filtering and anom-
aly detection. However, such attacks do not easily generalize to
different learning algorithms. More systematic attacks, based on
the exploitation of KKT conditions to solve the bilevel problem
corresponding to poisoning attacks have been subsequently pro-
posed in [8, 20, 23, 39]. In particular, Biggio et al. [8] have been the
first to demonstrate the vulnerability of SVMs to poisoning attacks.
Following the same approach, Xiao et al. [39] have shown how to
poison LASSO, ridge regression, and the elastic net. Finally, Mei and
Zhu [23] has systematized such attacks under a unified framework
to poison convex learning algorithms with Tikhonov regularizers,
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Figure 5: Poisoning samples targeting the CNN.
based on the concept of machine teaching [29, 40]. The fact that
these techniques require full re-training of the learning algorithm
at each iteration (to fulfil the KKT conditions up to a sufficient finite
precision), along with the intrinsic complexity required to compute
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Figure 6: Poisoning samples targeting the LR.
the corresponding gradients, makes them too computationally de-
manding for several practical settings. Furthermore, this limits their
applicability to a wider class of learning algorithms, including those
based on gradient descent and subsequent variants, like deep neural
networks, as their optimization is often truncated prior to meeting
the stationarity conditions with the precision required to compute
the poisoning gradients effectively. Note also that, despite recent
work [20] has provided a first proof of concept of the existence
of adversarial training examples against deep networks, this has
been shown on a binary classification task using a surrogate model
(attacked with standard KKT-based poisoning). In particular, the
authors have generated the poisoning samples by attacking a logis-
tic classifier trained on the features extracted from the penultimate
layer of the network (which have been kept fixed). Accordingly, to
our knowledge, our work is thus the first to show how to poison a
deep neural network in an end-to-end manner, considering all its
parameters and layers, and without using any surrogate model. No-
tably, our work is also the first to show (in a more systematic way)
that poisoning samples can be transferred across different learning
algorithms, using substitute (a.k.a. surrogate) models, as similarly
demonstrated for evasion attacks (i.e., adversarial test examples)
in [6, 37] against SVMs and NNs, and subsequently in [27] against
deep networks.
6 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND
FUTUREWORK
Advances in machine learning have led to a massive use of data-
driven technologies with emerging applications in many differ-
ent fields, including cybersecurity, self-driving cars, data analytics,
biometrics and industrial control systems. At the same time, the
variability and sophistication of cyberattacks have tremendously
increased, making machine learning systems an appealing target
for cybercriminals [2, 16].
In this work, we have considered the threat of training data
poisoning, i.e., an attack in which the training data is purposely
manipulated to maximally degrade the classification performance
of learning algorithms. While previous work has shown the effec-
tiveness of such attacks against binary learners [8, 20, 23, 39], in
this work we have been the first to consider poisoning attacks in
multiclass classification settings. To this end, we have extended the
commonly-used threat model proposed in [1, 2, 16] by introducing
the concept of error specificity, to denote whether the attacker aims
to cause specific misclassification errors (i.e., misclassifying sam-
ples as a specific class), or generic ones (i.e., misclassifying samples
as any class different than the correct one).
Another important contribution of this work has been to over-
come the limitations of state-of-the-art poisoning attacks, which
require exploiting the stationarity (KKT) conditions of the attacked
learning algorithms to optimize the poisoning samples [8, 20, 23, 39].
As discussed throughout this work, this requirement, as well as
the intrinsic complexity of such attacks, limits their application
only to a reduced class of learning algorithms. In this work, we
have overcome these limitations by proposing a novel poisoning
algorithm based on back-gradient optimization [14, 22, 31]. Our
approach can be applied to a wider class of learning algorithms,
as it only requires the learning algorithm to update smoothly its
parameters during training, without even necessarily fulfilling the
optimality conditions with very high precision. Moreover, the gra-
dients can be accurately estimated with the parameters obtained
from an incomplete optimization of the learning algorithm trun-
cated to a reduced number of iterations. This enables the efficient
application of our attack strategy to large neural networks and
deep learning architectures, as well as any other learning algorithm
trained through gradient-based procedures. Our empirical evalua-
tion on spam filtering, malware detection, and handwritten digit
recognition has shown that neural networks can be significantly
compromised even if the attacker only controls a small fraction of
training points. We have also empirically shown that poisoning
samples designed against one learning algorithm can be rather
effective also in poisoning another algorithm, highlighting an in-
teresting transferability property, as that shown for evasion attacks
(a.k.a. adversarial test examples) [6, 27, 37].
The main limitation of this work is that we have not run an
extensive evaluation of poisoning attacks against deep networks,
to thoroughly assess their security to poisoning. Although our
preliminary experiments seem to show that they can be more re-
silient against this threat than other learning algorithms, a more
complete and systematic analysis remains to be performed. There-
fore, we plan to more systematically investigate the effectiveness
of our back-gradient poisoning attack against deep networks in
the very near future. Besides the extension and evaluation of this
poisoning attack strategy to different deep learning architectures
and nonparametric models, further research avenues include: the
investigation of the existence of universal perturbations (not depen-
dent on the initial attack point) for poisoning samples against deep
networks, similarly to the case of universal adversarial test exam-
ples [15, 24]; and the evaluation of defense mechanisms against
poisoning attacks, through the exploitation of data sanitization and
robust learning algorithms [5, 32, 35].
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